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The classification and nomenclature of ‘medically unexplained symptoms’: conflict, 
performativity and critique 
 
Monica Greco 
 
Abstract 
 
Medically unexplained symptoms – including the many syndromes that fall under this 
umbrella – involve a discrepancy between professional knowledge and lay experience 
and are often associated with latent or explicit dynamics of conflict.  Although this 
conflictual dimension has been amply documented, little critical attention has been paid 
to how nomenclature and classification inform the conflictual dynamic and are informed 
by it in turn. In this paper I engage with this question by focusing on debates around the 
medical terminology in use, and on the alternative terminology developed by social 
scientists. I argue that, in different ways, medical and social scientific discourse collude 
in a performative disavowal of the psychological dimension of ‘MUS’. I then discuss the 
paradoxical character of this disavowal and suggest that it tends to perpetuate polemical 
modes of engagement around ‘MUS’. I conclude with suggestions on how critical 
research might counteract this tendency. 
 
The expression ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ (MUS) has gained currency over the 
last thirty years and is now used routinely in the clinical literature (Nettleton, 2006). It 
refers to a wide range of symptoms when these are not supported by clinical or 
paraclinical findings, and are therefore ‘not attributable to any known conventionally 
defined disease’ (Fink et al., 2005: 772). The expression covers a wide spectrum of 
severity, from mild discomfort that many people accept as a normal part of living, to 
clinically significant symptoms that may involve intense pain and serious impairment, 
often lasting many years (Kroenke and Price, 1993; Katon et al., 1991). People with 
unexplained symptoms are seen and managed in contexts that vary from primary care 
settings to the whole range of medical specialties, where they may receive different 
diagnoses. Examples include irritable bowel syndrome or IBS (gastroenterology); chronic 
pelvic pain (gynaecology); fibromyalgia (rheumatology); non-cardiac chest pain 
(cardiology); hyperventilation syndrome (respiratory medicine); chronic fatigue 
syndrome/ME (neurology/immunology); somatoform disorders (psychiatry). Many 
receive symptomatic treatment, repeated investigations, and multiple specialist referrals, 
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suggesting that needs are not being met and that costly resources are being used 
ineffectively (McGorm et al., 2010; Bass and Benjamin, 1993). Medically unexplained 
symptoms are said to be a problem of significant clinical proportions, with their 
prevalence estimated at up to 50% of consultations in primary care (Ring et al., 2005) and 
at an average of 21% across secondary care specialties (Reid et al. 2003). Estimates 
however vary greatly, as the task of estimating prevalence is beset by particular 
difficulties in this field (Fink et al., 2005), since there is no consensus on how 
unexplained symptoms should be diagnosed, categorised, and named (McFarlane et al., 
2008; Smith and Dwamena, 2007). Even basic taxonomical questions – such as ‘are we 
dealing with one or many phenomena when it comes to describing medically unexplained 
symptoms?’ (Deary, 1999: 51) – remain open to debate. 
 
This article focuses on questions of nomenclature and classification in relation to the 
conflictual dimension of ‘MUS’.  Medically unexplained symptoms – including the many 
syndromes that fall under this umbrella – involve a discrepancy between professional 
knowledge and lay experience, such that they can appear ‘medically suspect even when 
they are experientially devastating’ (Barker, 2008: 21). What I here call the conflictual 
dimension of ‘MUS’ stems from this predicament and is evident to various degrees 
across different sites, ranging from the clinic to patient support groups and the internet 
(Salmon, 2007; Banks and Prior, 2001; Dumit, 2006; Barker, 2008). Although this 
conflictual dimension has been amply documented, little critical attention has been paid 
to how nomenclature and classification inform the conflictual dynamic, and are informed 
by it in turn. In this paper I engage with this question by focusing on debates around the 
medical terminology in use, and on the alternative terminology developed by social 
scientists. I will argue that, in different ways, medical and social scientific discourse 
collude in a disavowal of the psychological dimension of ‘MUS’. I then discuss the 
paradoxical character of this disavowal and suggest that it tends to perpetuate polemical 
modes of engagement that are counterproductive.  
 
The paper has a critical and reflexive aim. It seeks to shift the research agendas of social 
scientists working in this field by highlighting how some of their current terminological 
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choices – underpinned by specific methodological and political commitments – 
performatively feed into what can become a polemical deadlock. In the philosophy of 
language, where the term ‘performativity’ originates, performative utterances are 
utterances that do not merely represent or describe a phenomenon, but rather enact or 
produce – indeed, perform – its reality. ‘I pronounce you man and wife’ is the classic 
example of such an utterance (Austin, 1962). Over the last two decades the concept of 
performativity has been developed and widely discussed across the humanities and social 
sciences, most notably within feminist and queer theory (Butler, 1990 and 1993; 
Sedgwick, 2003) and in science and technology studies (Pickering, 1994; Callon, 1998 
and 2007). In these fields, the concept has become central to a more general critique of 
representationalism, and to alternatives based on conceiving reality (or ontology) in terms 
of process rather than substance (Barad, 2003; Whitehead, 1985). Despite different 
emphases and nuances, ‘performativity’ is thus used to address the reality-producing 
effects of all socio-material practices. Even when the practice under scrutiny is a practice 
of representation, as in academic or scientific accounts of a given phenomenon, the 
relevant question from the perspective of performativity is what that representation or 
description does, what it adds to the world in terms of possibilities or constraints, what 
reality it performs (Law & Singleton, 2000).  My aim in this paper is thus to highlight the 
performative consequences of certain ways of framing the problem of ‘MUS’ within 
social scientific accounts and within medical debates on nomenclature and classification. 
While my argument implies the reality-producing power of these accounts, it should not 
be read as an empirical claim about the importance of these accounts relative to the 
multiple other forces at play in ‘MUS’.  It is rather an invitation to consider what 
possibilities for thought and action these accounts perform, and the quality (not quantity) 
of their contribution to the overall dynamics of ‘MUS’ as a field.  
 
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that the expression ‘medically unexplained 
symptoms’ is by no means unproblematic, and has been an object of critique on the part 
of social and clinical scientists alike (Jutel, 2010; Creed et al., 2010).  In what follows I 
shall use ‘MUS’ as a placeholder: as a noun that works as a pronoun (e.g. ‘thingamajig’), 
in the sense that its referent is not fixed to a single concept but shifts according to 
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context, taking on different connotations each time. I will examine some of these 
connotations later in this article, alongside those of several other terms employed to 
describe and categorise symptoms that are medically unexplained.  
 
The polemical knot 
 
The conflictual dimension of ‘MUS’ is familiar to those involved more or less directly in 
this field, whether as patients, clinicians or researchers, although empirically it is not a 
uniform or universal phenomenon. Conflictual dynamics are not always present, and 
when they exist they can be more or less explicit depending on the spaces in which they 
occur. For example, the notion that patients with unexplained symptoms tend to insist on 
the physical nature of their condition and to pressurise doctors into prescribing somatic 
interventions appears warranted in relation to secondary and tertiary care settings, more 
than in relation to general practice (Ring et al., 2005; Euba et al., 1996; see Salmon & 
May, 1995).  In a secondary care context, doctors and patients have been said to interact 
as ‘opponents who [use] specific strategies to assert authority by emphasizing contrasting 
areas of expertise: knowledge of subjective symptoms vs the inside of the body’ 
(Marchant-Haycox & Salmon, 1997: 440). At the same time, studies of the self-reported 
experiences of doctors and patients in primary care demonstrate that intense feelings of 
mutual distrust, resentment and hostility exist on both sides, even if they may not be 
overtly expressed in the clinical encounter (Wileman et al., 2002; Peters et al., 1998). 
Such feelings are also reflected in the informal expressions that are commonly used 
among doctors to refer to patients who repeatedly present with unexplained symptoms: 
‘crocks’, ‘thick folder patients’, ‘frequent flyers’, ‘heartsink patients’, and so on.  The 
conflictual dimension of ‘MUS’ is probably most explicit and intense outside the clinic, 
in spaces such as internet support groups and forums, and in relation to certain conditions 
more than others. The cases of CFS/ME and fibromyalgia are among the most 
conspicuous and best researched in this sense; both have been discussed in connection 
with patient activism and direct challenges to medical expertise (Zavetoski et al., 2004; 
Barrett, 2004; Barker, 2008; Wolfe, 2009). However, none of these spaces or conditions 
exist in isolation.  What goes on in clinical interactions is ‘routinely echoed in a much 
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wider political field’ (Banks and Prior, 2001: 12) and viceversa. Last but not least, the 
conflict – whether latent or explicit – is clinically very significant. In response to it, 
patients may embark in a long career of multiple medical consultations (sometimes 
disparagingly referred to as ‘doctor shopping’) that not only may fail to provide a 
satisfactory explanation and care for the physical symptoms, but may also come to be 
seen as a symptom in its own right (of abnormal illness behaviour, indicating cognitive 
distortions as to the significance of the symptoms). 
 
In The Logic of Care (2008) Mol powerfully demonstrates that in the domain of practice, 
as opposed to that of abstract treatment protocols or textbook medicine, situations of 
uncertainty and failure are not exceptional and marginal, but are rather routinely 
encountered and regarded as the norm. The conflict at play in practices around 
unexplained symptoms, however, stems from a very different kind of uncertainty: one 
that concerns the very definition of the medical situation and what should follow from it, 
even in the abstract. On the medical side, the ‘failure’ is often described in terms of the 
use of expensive biomedical resources on patients who do not in fact need them (Shaw 
and Creed, 1991; Fink, 1992; Smith, 1994; Reid et al., 2002; Barsky et al., 2005). The 
multiple interventions offered to ‘MUS’ patients are not only perceived as 
disproportionate and unwarranted, but as part of the problem rather than the solution. For 
indeed, while supposedly unnecessary, these interventions are not devoid of medical risk 
and may give rise to biomedical problems where none existed in the first place. In some 
cases, interventions are said to directly feed into a patient’s (psycho-)pathology, as in the 
example of a woman sexually abused in childhood seeking to ‘repeat the trauma’ by 
undergoing pelvic surgery (Walker et al., 1998).  
 
Turning to the side of the patient, the study of sufferers’ concerns and narratives in 
relation to ‘MUS’ as such is comparatively in its infancy (see Nettleton, 2006; Nettleton 
et al., 2004 and 2005), but there is a wealth of literature on related conditions such as 
chronic pain, IBS, fibromyalgia, or CFS/ME, demonstrating that care appears equally 
problematic, albeit for different reasons, from the patient perspective. This literature has 
underlined the importance of a valid diagnosis for legitimating illness, be it for legal, 
 6 
insurance, and/or welfare purposes (e.g. Dumit, 2006; Mik-Meyer, 2010) or at an 
experiential level, for the purpose of creating meaning (e.g. Nettleton, 2006; Madden and 
Sim, 2006; Bülow and Hydén, 2003). In particular, the social scientific literature has 
underlined how psychological explanations of symptoms can be a source of 
delegitimation, in so far as they are taken to imply that the illness is not as ‘real’ as 
physical disease (Kirmayer, 1988). Psychosomatic explanations can be used by 
practitioners as a ‘blame-shifting’ device (Horton-Salway, 2002), while the reference to 
concepts like ‘masked depression’ can function discursively to undermine the status of 
sufferers’ experiential knowledge (Horton-Salway, 2004). Due to their stigmatising 
character, diagnoses of mental illness have been described as an ‘attack against [CFS 
sufferers’] identity’ (Tucker, 2004: 155), which sufferers are keen to avoid by positioning 
themselves as having a ‘knowable physical illness’ (2004: 163; see also Horton-Salway, 
2001).  
 
In sum, we have a situation where each side of the doctor-patient relationship has reason 
to lament and to question the premises on which the understanding and care of MUS 
operate. Historically informed social analysis has further added to this picture by arguing 
that this conflictual predicament is rooted in the epistemological privilege accorded to the 
‘visible’ within modern medicine (Rhodes et al., 1999; Foucault, 1973). This privilege 
results in the failure to account for ‘MUS’ – where ‘symptoms’ do not correspond to a 
demonstrable ‘sign’ – other than in psychiatric terms (Greco, 1998; Jutel, 2010). In this 
sense ‘MUS’, to paraphrase Horacio Fabrega, are ‘a cultural and historical product of 
Western medicine’ (Fabrega, 1990; see also Kirmayer, 1984 and 1986). 
 
Social research has made a vital contribution in articulating the concerns that stem from 
the patient experience of marginalisation and delegitimation. In what follows, however, I 
propose to focus on the performative dimension of this contribution to invite reflection on 
some of its potential unintended effects.  I will suggest that, in giving voice to these 
concerns, social research has amplified the failure and the conflict associated with 
‘MUS’. I use the word ‘amplified’ to convey an ambiguity: in the first instance, by 
adding the voice of academic analysis to that of lay experience and of organised activism, 
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social research has made the conflict louder, its outlines more clearly intelligible, 
facilitating recognition and discussion of the difficult predicament of many patients. This 
has been both necessary and useful. But to the extent that this voicing settles on the 
reiteration of a number of established (pro)positions, the conflict is amplified also in a 
different sense, namely in the sense of being reinforced. The conflict acquires a certain 
solidity and factualness, it becomes itself a ‘datum’ of experience informing expectations, 
forms of identification, and corresponding strategies of lay and professionals alike. The 
risk in this latter sense, to extend the metaphor, is for social scientific research to amplify 
a broken record – to contribute to the sclerotisation of the positions involved, and to the 
stagnation of debate along unproductive lines.  
 
A crucial aspect of this process, I contend, stems from how social scientists have engaged 
with questions of classification and nomenclature. Aside from cursory acknowledgments 
of the multiplicity and controversial character of the various terms in use, social scientific 
research has tended to address medically unexplained symptoms in abstraction from 
medical debates on diagnostic taxonomy and nomenclature. Instead, data relative to 
patients with specific diagnoses (e.g. ME/CFS, fibromyalgia, IBS) or with undiagnosed 
symptoms have been discussed in terms of sociologically defined categories and 
concepts, such as ‘contested’, ‘controversial’, or ‘debatable’ illness (e.g. Dumit, 2006; 
Horton-Salway, 2007; Tucker, 2004), ‘illegitimate illness’ (e.g. Cooper, 1997; Ware, 
1992) or ‘illness without a label’ (e.g. Nettleton et al., 2004 and 2005). Nettleton 
synthesises this trend in referring to this literature as an ‘emerging sociology of uncertain 
illness’ (2006: 1168). The use of this terminology is partly a reflection of methodological 
choices: a common feature of this work has been a focus on the discursive dimension, 
with empirical foci ranging from the rhetorical strategies of patient activists, to 
experiential narratives of illness, to analyses of practitioners’ and sufferers’ situated talk, 
in a broadly (social-) constructionist framework. In the task of illustrating these various 
forms of discourse the researcher draws on the language of participants, and supposedly 
adopts a position of epistemological neutrality as to the extra-discursive dimension of the 
symptoms. This extra-discursive dimension, by default, thus remains a matter for 
medicine to represent and define, in a division of labour faithful to the distinction 
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between ‘illness’ and ‘disease’ (cf. Timmermans and Haas, 2008). Aside from a 
methodological commitment, the descriptive terms employed by social scientists also 
reflect, with few exceptions (e.g. Barker, 2008), a political commitment towards 
validating ‘lay’ narratives. This commitment is often underpinned by researchers’ own 
experience of the illness they study (e.g. Cooper, 1997). Narrative validation offers a 
measure of legitimacy to correct sufferers’ disenfranchisement by the medical system. 
This is done by avoiding the (medical) concepts and terms that are perceived, by many 
patients, to be loaded against them, and by producing, as we have seen, an alternative and 
parallel nomenclature – one that patients can recognise and accept, and that doctors on 
their part cannot argue with.   
 
The problem with this approach is that it is too comfortable. Firstly, the vocabulary of 
epistemological neutrality takes no risks with the thorny question of (re-)defining the 
(extra-discursive) realities of ‘MUS’. Ostensibly at least, it leaves this task entirely to the 
parties directly involved in conflict, adding little or nothing to their linguistic and 
conceptual repertoire. This also means, of course, that the performative role of discourse 
(including the discourse of social scientists) in shaping the extra-discursive reality of 
‘MUS’ remains beyond any possibility of articulation. Secondly, the political 
commitment towards validating lay narratives often reinforces, albeit implicitly and by 
default, an impression that ‘MUS’ nomenclature and classification (and the realities these 
are designed to convey) are uncontroversial among the medical profession itself. What is 
involved, in other words, is an implicit construction of ‘medicine’ as a singular and 
internally cohesive other (cf. Mol, 2002), and – with all due exception for the qualities of 
individual practitioners – an antagonistic other at that.  
 
With this background in mind, using ‘MUS’ as a placeholder serves to describe what in 
Foucauldian terms would be called a space of problematisation: a space to be unpacked 
and articulated in terms of its internal differences, tensions, and paradoxes, and with a 
view to defining tacit assumptions that may hold across lines of apparent conflict. It is 
important to underline that approaching ‘MUS’ in this way also specifies an ethics of 
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engagement, one that Foucault explicitly contrasted with the morality implicit in 
polemics. ‘The polemicist’, he wrote 
 
… proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never 
agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorising him to wage 
war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is 
not a partner in the search for the truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is 
wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For 
him, then, the game does not consist of recognising this person as a subject 
having the right to speak, but of abolishing him, as interlocutor, from any 
possible dialogue; and his final objective will be, not to come as close as 
possible to a difficult truth, but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he 
has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a 
legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied. (Foucault, 1984: 382) 
 
Both the dismissive doctor (or ‘medicine’) and the ‘difficult’ patient can be recognised in 
the figure of the polemicist, respectively encased in the privilege of professional authority 
on the one hand, and of experience on the other. The move beyond this polemical 
situation in the search for a ‘difficult truth’ requires, in the first instance, that we look 
beyond these figures – not because they are purely fictional, since concrete instances of 
such types do exist, but because, in their deadlock, they constitute the most conservative 
elements of the configuration.  
 
In what follows, I will disturb this simple contrast between the rhetorical figures of 
doctor and patient in the attempt to loosen the polemical knot that ties them together. I 
will begin by offering an overview of the lack of consensus within medicine with regard 
to how ‘MUS’ should be categorised and named, through an analysis and discussion of 
the different terms in current use. Focusing on the problem of nomenclature and 
classification serves to produce a more nuanced understanding of the multiple character 
of medical (pro)positions, in the interest of constructing medical expertise as a possible 
interlocutor rather than a polemical opponent. This lack of consensus is a complex 
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phenomenon in terms of its historical genealogy, and my purpose here is not to account 
for it in terms of the events and power relations that have produced it. In describing these 
multiple (pro)positions, my aim is rather to present the lack of consensus itself as 
evidence of a form of care that is virtually unacknowledged as such. Ultimately, 
however, my aim is to highlight that a performative paradox characterises the medical 
response to lay concerns. 
 
Caring for names and categories 
 
‘Medically unexplained symptoms’ is only one among several terms used in the clinical 
literature – other terms include (but are not limited to) ‘somatisation’, ‘functional somatic 
symptoms/syndromes’ and ‘somatoform disorder’. These are sometimes used 
interchangeably, but more often to acknowledge that different terminologies carry inbuilt 
assumptions about aetiology or connotations over which there is no consensus. Before 
examining the connotations of each of these terms, it is worth recalling that there are as 
yet no agreed clinical or research diagnostic criteria for patients with ‘MUS’ (McFarlane, 
2008). Of the expressions just mentioned, only ‘somatoform disorders’ figures as a 
formal diagnostic category within DSM-IV and in ICD-10, and it is currently being 
revised in ways that I will discuss below. 
 
MUS 
 
‘MUS’ is a generic expression and one with a relatively recent history (Nettleton, 2006). 
As a label, it is increasingly used by practitioners and researchers particularly in the 
primary care context, and is often associated with (but not confined to) illness that 
remains undiagnosed. The expression is preferred because of its supposed neutrality, in 
that by definition it does not imply a causal mechanism. It is therefore neutral also in 
terms of attributing any error of judgment to either doctor or patient: the suggestion is 
that the symptoms are as yet unexplained, and that the patient could be right in supposing 
that they have a physical origin. ‘MUS’ in this sense anticipates a conflict and is designed 
to divert it, by deliberately leaving open the question of aetiology and thus theoretically 
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removing the stigma associated with the notion that the symptoms are ‘all in the mind’ 
(Guthrie, 2008). On this basis, it is incorrect to assume that ‘MUS’ implies psychogenic 
illness, as some commentators in the social sciences have done (e.g. Jutel, 2010). To read 
the label straightforwardly in this way fails to acknowledge the problematisation of 
aetiological assumptions that it is designed to convey, and fosters what many clinicians 
would regard as a misunderstanding of the term (albeit a frequently encountered one).  
The reasons clinical researchers offer for positively adopting the label are akin to those I 
offered earlier in this paper, when I invited the reader to let ‘MUS’ function as a 
‘placeholder’ – a noun without a clear and unambiguous referent. These reasons should 
not be ignored, not because the label is unproblematic (since it is, in ways that we shall 
see), but because in ignoring them we would elide some of the internal complexity of the 
medical (pro)position.  
 
The very neutrality of ‘MUS’ as an expression accounts for some of the ways in which 
the label can be problematic from both doctors’ and patients’ perspectives. ‘MUS’ is not 
itself a diagnosis but rather a diagnostic no man’s land; it does not perform any of the 
positive functions diagnoses are meant to perform, namely to explain, legitimise and 
normalise. As clinicians recognise, at a connotative level ‘MUS’ is far from neutral, and 
is often understood as meaning that symptoms are indeed ‘all in the mind’ (Stone et al., 
2002). Accordingly, the expression ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ has been 
identified as a barrier to improved care, since patients tend to resent the label as 
dismissive (Creed et al., 2010). The placeholder function of ‘MUS’, however, also lends 
itself to an opposite interpretation: the suggestion implicit in the label that symptoms are 
as yet unexplained can reinforce the expectation that, given sufficient investment and 
research, a biomedical cause will be found. 
 
In her sociological critique of the ‘MUS’ category, Jutel has argued that it ‘reifies the 
notion that all physical complaints without explanation can be viewed in the same way … 
by framing them as a problem to be approached epidemiologically’ (2010: 234). This is 
potentially a valid point but only on condition that such reification is not in fact useful – a 
judgment that cannot be made in the abstract, but only in relation to specific contexts, 
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problems, and tasks (Mol, 2008: 62-66). In considering ‘MUS’ as an epidemiological 
category, we should rather be intrigued that not all physical complaints without 
explanation are viewed in the same way, or indeed addressed as ‘MUS’. Doctors 
routinely treat conditions, such as migraine, with no known organic cause and for which 
explanations exist only at the level of hypotheses. What marks ‘MUS’ as different, 
presumably, is not a lack of explanation per se, but other characteristics shared by this 
category of symptoms and/or patients (e.g. the difficulties associated with the diagnostic 
process; the lack of effective treatment or the character of effective treatment; the 
dynamics involved in their care). In other words, what marks ‘MUS’ as different is the 
‘difficult truth’ that remains implicit in the label. 
 
Functional somatic syndrome 
 
The expression ‘functional somatic syndrome’ is most relevant to secondary and tertiary 
care settings. It refers to symptoms that cluster in recognizable patterns, which ‘suggest a 
shared underlying malfunction of a particular body system’ (Guthrie, 2008: 432), hence 
the pertinence of corresponding medical specialisms.  ‘Functional somatic syndrome’ is 
the umbrella term comprising specific diagnoses such as IBS, chronic pelvic pain, 
fibromyalgia and CFS/ME among others. Advocates of categorization in terms of 
‘functional somatic syndrome(s)’ argue that there are significant similarities between 
these, both in terms of symptom overlap and in terms of underlying genetic, 
physiological and psychological mechanisms, and that these similarities outweigh the 
differences between diagnoses (Henningsen and Creed, 2010; Fink et al., 2007). Some go 
so far as to say that the different terms and diagnoses associated with ‘MUS’ can and do 
refer to ‘a single syndrome that receives different labels depending on the medical 
specialty where it is encountered’ (Brown, 2007: 772; see also Aaron and Buchwald, 
2001; Wessely, 2004; Wessely et al., 1999; White, 2004). Theoretically, the alternative 
between considering ‘MUS’ as a single syndrome or as several different ones need not be 
so absolute, and indeed an intermediate position exists advocating recognition of different 
sub-groups of patients, ‘some of whom experience symptoms that are specific to a 
particular body system … and others who are polysymptomatic and who would meet 
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criteria for many functional syndromes’ (Brown 2007: 772; see Guthrie et al., 2003; 
Wilson et al., 2001). However, this intermediate position by no means resolves the 
challenge of classification: for the distinction between patients with symptoms specific to 
a body system versus those whose symptoms span across systems does not map 
coherently onto the distinction between existing diagnoses, such as fibromyalgia or CFS, 
associated with different medical specialties. 
 
The term ‘functional’ literally refers to disturbance in function, both at the level of organs 
or body systems and at the level of desired or expected daily social functions, as opposed 
to a disturbance or anomaly in structure. Strictly speaking it implies the absence of a 
lesion rather than psychological aetiology, but the term has a long history of being used 
among doctors as code for ‘psychogenic’. These connotations, however, are not 
necessarily shared by patients, with at least one study arguing that patients found the term 
‘functional’ less offensive than the expression ‘medically unexplained’ (Stone et al., 
2002). A recent study of the meanings of ‘functional’ among UK neurologists has 
demonstrated the term’s significant ambiguity, with a majority of neurologists using it to 
convey that the illness is ‘not organic’ while a significant minority use it to indicate 
‘abnormalities in brain or body function, or a psychiatric disorder’ (Kanaan et al., 2012: 
249).  The study also showed that this ambiguity was considered useful, at least by some, 
in helping to avoid ‘difficult discussion’.  
 
Somatisation and somatoform disorders 
 
Though often used generically and explicitly discredited as a scientific construct 
(Crombez et al., 2009), the term ‘somatisation’ points to the diagnostic category of 
somatoform disorders in DSM-IV, and shares some of the problems associated with that 
category. These have been widely debated for nearly a decade now in the process of 
consultation leading up to a new edition of the DSM, which is due to appear in 2013. 
While DSM has traditionally been addressed to an audience of mental health 
professionals, it is significant that in the context of this revision – and particularly in 
connection with the category of somatoform disorders – two further groups are being 
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suggested as relevant stakeholders: firstly, clinicians in primary care and medical and 
surgical subspecialty settings, because these are the settings where the majority of 
patients with unexplained symptoms are encountered; and secondly patients themselves, 
who have an interest in the diagnosis they receive, and who find the implications of the 
current classification difficult to accept (Mayou et al., 2005).  
 
DSM-IV is supposed to be a-theoretical: the diagnostic categories are designed to be 
descriptive, rather than reflecting commitment to specific aetiological theories. The term 
‘somatisation’ and the category of somatoform disorders, however, carry strong 
connotations of psychological causation. The category of somatoform disorders includes 
conversion disorder, which bears a direct genealogical link with hysteria, and a direct 
association with Freud’s proposition that infrapsychic conflicts could be ‘converted’ into 
a somatic form. The term somatoform reflects this legacy, in that it literally describes the 
disorder as being ‘in the shape of’ something somatic (by implication: when in fact it is 
psychological). Diagnoses of somatoform disorder are also adjacent to the diagnosis of 
factitious illness and to the concept of malingering: a differential diagnosis of 
somatoform disorder requires excluding the conscious fabrication of symptoms, and the 
explicit possibility that the patient may be deviant rather than ill. As it is currently 
framed, the category of somatoform disorders points directly to the functions of forensic 
and moral arbitration that medicine and psychiatry socially perform, alongside and in 
addition to the function of providing care (Greco, 1998). 
 
There are many ways in which the category of somatoform disorders is deemed 
problematic. The most important of these, perhaps, is the emphasis on the exclusion of 
organic factors as a main diagnostic criterion (Mayou et al., 2005). Despite the claim of 
DSM-IV to being a-theoretical, therefore, the category does imply an alternative between 
psychological and organic causation, suggesting that they are mutually exclusive. 
Another main point of criticism is that ‘somatoform’ diagnostic categories were 
developed in highly selected patient populations, namely in the field of psychiatry. The 
argument is made that they are ‘so narrowly defined that they defy clinical application, 
especially in primary care’ (Fink et al., 2005: 774). Last but not least, the nomenclature 
 15 
of somatoform disorders is typically unacceptable to patients. Patients’ perceptions of the 
diagnosis they receive and of the implications of their classification have been described 
as an important factor to be considered in the proposals for a revised edition of DSM 
(Mayou et al., 2005). 
 
The proposed revisions, still not definitive, attempt to address some of these issues (APA, 
2011). In the proposals the term somatoform has been abandoned, in favour of a new 
general category called Somatic Symptoms Disorders. Similarly, there is no longer an 
emphasis on the exclusion of organic factors as a main diagnostic criterion, on the basis 
that assessments of medical symptoms as ‘unexplained’ are unreliable. In a bold move, 
the new category subsumes (and redescribes) what were previously Somatoform 
Disorders and Psychological Factors Affecting Medical Condition into a single group, 
acknowledging the importance of physical symptoms and/or concern over medical illness 
across these presentations, regardless of presumed aetiology and (psychiatric or medical) 
co-morbidity. At the same time, the proposed revisions accentuate the emphasis on the 
importance of ‘cognitive distortions’ (such as high health-related anxiety, or a tendency 
to catastrophise) which, arguably, are no more reliably assessed than ‘unexplained’ 
symptoms themselves and may be exacerbated by conflict in the doctor-patient 
relationship. It is these cognitive distortions – defined as such not by the belief that an 
organic condition is present when in fact it is absent, but by an exaggeration of the 
significance of symptoms – that would warrant psychiatric referral and a psychiatric 
diagnosis. This opens the option for non-psychiatric diagnoses (typically, functional 
somatic syndromes) to retain their pertinence for all cases where cognitive distortions are 
absent, or namely where patients are able to live with the aetiological uncertainty of their 
condition without this causing them too much distress.  
 
Symptoms ‘in their own right’ 
 
While critics of current classification and nomenclature often problematise specific 
aetiological assumptions implicit in certain terms – such as the assumption of 
psychogenesis that is implicit in the concept of somatisation – some researchers currently 
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problematise the focus on aetiology as at a more general level. Sharpe et al (2006) for 
example have argued that many of the existing diagnostic categories used in connection 
with unexplained symptoms imply hypothetical (i.e. unproven) underlying pathology, 
whether physical (as in e.g. fibromyalgia) or psychological (as in somatoform disorders). 
This is problematic because it perpetuates the erroneous assumption – among 
professionals and patients alike – that there is a simple causal relationship between bodily 
symptoms and underlying pathology, which runs contrary to ‘emergent understandings of 
bodily symptoms as reflecting the brain’s integration of multiple aetiological factors’ 
(Sharpe et al., 2006: 355). These authors among others thus argue for a more radical 
reconfiguration of categorisation that would enable symptoms to be researched, managed 
and classified ‘in their own right’, not just as surface manifestations of either bodily 
disease or psychopathology (Sharpe et al., 2006; Kroenke and Harris, 2001). 
 
Categories as performative tools 
 
This overview of the ongoing discussion on the appropriate classification and 
nomenclature for ‘MUS’ illustrates a degree of reflexivity and internal critique on the 
part of medical discourse that may come as a surprise to many. As such it can be read as 
the expression of a logic of care, where ‘categories are not taken to be fixed reflections of 
a given reality, but tools to work with’ (Mol, 2008: 63). In the repeated acknowledgments 
of the ways in which nomenclature – and particularly the unacceptability to patients of 
much of the terminology currently in use – interferes with the provision of satisfactory 
care, the medical research literature on ‘MUS’ displays an explicit awareness of the 
performative dimension of categorising.  
 
A closely related impression emerging from this overview concerns the caution with 
which the psychological dimension of unexplained symptoms is addressed. This caution 
is entirely understandable in light of the insights provided by lay experts, ranging from 
patient activists to social scientists, concerning the impact of ‘psychologisation’ on the 
experience of sufferers. Because it is entirely understandable, however, it is rarely 
critically examined, and this is what I propose to do in the next and final section. I will 
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argue that an element of paradox is involved in the caution against the psychological, 
when this caution is performed uncritically and with a limited conception of the 
‘psychological’ itself.  
 
 
Colluding against the ‘psychological’: a performative paradox 
 
Responding to the perceived unacceptability of psychological attributions to patients, the 
discourse on ‘MUS’ nomenclature and classification may itself be said to display a 
certain resistance to the ‘psychological’ as an explanatory and descriptive trope. 
Remarkable in this regard is the disclaimer we find in the introduction to the current 
edition of DSM-IV, where we read that 
 
the term mental disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between ‘mental’ 
disorders and ‘physical’ disorders that is a reductionist anachronism of 
mind/body dualism. A compelling literature documents that there is much 
‘physical’ in ‘mental’ disorders, and much ‘mental’ in ‘physical’ disorders. 
The problem raised by the term ‘mental’ disorders has been much clearer than 
its solution, and, unfortunately, the term persists in the title of DSM-IV 
because we have not found an appropriate substitute. (APA, 2000: xxx) 
 
What is striking about this statement is not the gesture towards acknowledging 
ontological (and aetiological) complexity. The statement is remarkable rather in light of 
the fact that comparable disclaimers continue to appear entirely superfluous in relation to 
established ‘physical’ disease, such that a mind/body dualism remains culturally 
unchallenged, in practice, for the majority of recognised biomedical conditions. Seen 
within this wider context of signification, and despite its literal meaning, the DSM 
disclaimer reads as a one-sided disavowal of the ‘mental’ in favour of a culturally 
reassuring, de-stigmatising suggestion that there is a physical dimension, however yet 
unspecified it may be, underlying every psychiatric condition. A similar disavowal of the 
psychological is at play in the preference accorded by researchers to ‘MUS’. Like the 
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DSM, the expression ‘MUS’ is theoretically neutral on the question of aetiology, while as 
we have seen it can suggest that a physical explanation, though not yet apparent, is still 
available as a theoretical hypothesis. In both instances we are dealing with connotative 
suggestions of a disavowal, not with literal meanings, but arguably it is precisely at this 
level that statements are effective in shaping expectations, modes of identification, and 
strategies. 
 
The cautiousness apparent with regard to naming the ‘psychological’ is understandable, 
as we have seen, as an aspect of the reflexivity of medical discourse with regard to the 
performative dimension of naming and categorising. There is awareness, in other words, 
that the unacceptability of accounts framed in psychological terms – regardless of their 
potential pertinence – can compromise the relationship between patients and healthcare 
providers and thus contribute to an exacerbation of a patient’s suffering, which may 
include an aggravation of their physical symptoms. Accordingly, terms and categories 
suggestive of a psychological account must be avoided. There is, however, a paradoxical 
dimension to this strategy: for the great care taken in not offending sensibilities or 
‘hurting feelings’ is also, simultaneously, an acknowledgement and affirmation of the 
performative power of words and feelings. The DSM disclaimer itself – read as an 
affirmation of the complex nature of pathological processes – tells us that indeed all 
bodily processes and outcomes involve, are affected by, the ‘mental’. In this sense, the 
disavowal of the psychological can be regarded as a strategy for the management of 
patients’ suggestibility, based on a practice-based awareness of the performative nature of 
discourse.  
 
The disavowal of the psychological is paradoxical, therefore, because it implies a 
psychological account of the dynamics involved in symptom production, but one that that 
is not explicitly articulated as such. Crucially, the dynamics that remain tacit in such an 
account are not exclusively infra-psychic and located within the individual patient, but 
relational and intersubjective – i.e. social. They implicate discursive (socio-material) 
practices more generally in the process of symptom-production, such that it becomes 
difficult to say ‘whose’ the illness or the problem then is. Here lies the paradoxical eye of 
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the storm, the silence where the articulation of a ‘difficult truth’ might otherwise be. This 
truth is difficult in more than one sense: it is difficult because it requires the articulation 
of inherently complex processes, where recourse to simpler models designed to reduce 
complexity (e.g. mind/body dualism) is conspicuously failing; and it is difficult because 
its articulation is constrained by multiple obstacles and forms of resistance, of both a 
practical and political nature.  
 
In pointing to this disavowal of the psychological my aim is clearly not to insist on the 
psychological or ‘mental’ nature of symptoms to the exclusion of a physical dimension. 
Rather, it is to highlight a certain collusion at the level of discourse between clinicians, 
social scientists, patient advocates, and common prejudice – in other words, all the 
different voices at play in ‘MUS’ as a polemical field – in implicitly reinforcing the 
negative and reductive connotations of the ‘psychological’. Amid controversy, conflict, 
and debate, one proposition seems to acquire ever greater solidity and (apparent) 
consensus: the absence of a biomedical explanation must not lead to the inference that the 
‘mind’ is involved in the production of symptoms themselves (only, at most, in the 
exaggeration of their significance). Yet this proposition flies in the face of every 
aspiration to a non-dualist medical epistemology – which ironically constitutes the other 
major point of consensus across discursive positions. Ideally, we should be able to 
articulate how the ‘mind’ – and all that is subsumed in this elusive concept – participates 
in the production of every type of symptom, and indeed of biomedical disease (Foss, 
2002). But the familiar retort that symptoms are ‘all in the mind’, and especially its use as 
a way of dismissing symptoms as insignificant or motivated by secondary gain, haunts 
contemporary discourse on ‘MUS’ and charges any reference to the psychological 
character of symptoms with potentially explosive connotations. The question is whether 
the way out of this impasse, in the long term, is best served by conceding territory to 
those who would have the relevance of the psychological denied altogether, in favour of 
the continued search for purely physical or biomedical explanations. This concession lays 
the conditions for a perpetuation of conflict, not least because psychological interventions 
(coupled with the prescription of anti-depressants, in many cases) remain the option 
recommended at the level of treatment and management strategies.   
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Is there an alternative to this strategy of disavowal? An alternative exists, but in turn it is 
neither simple nor necessarily immediate in terms of its translation into clinical 
applications. Its point of departure lies in a problematisation of what the psychological 
dimension of ‘MUS’ is, and can be, understood to mean. A number of psychologists in 
the pain field are already explicitly countering some of the prejudicial associations of 
psychological attributions by advocating a ‘normal psychology of pain’ (see Eccleston, 
2011). At a different level of analysis, a number of critical psychologists are 
systematically re-evaluating the concept of ‘suggestion’  in terms of its relevance to all 
psychosocial processes, and articulating its potential in the context of addressing socio-
material and psycho-somatic relations (see Chertok and Stengers, 1992; Despret, 2004; 
Wilson, 2004; Blackman, 2007 and 2008; Motzkau, 2007, 2009, 2011; Brown and 
Stenner, 2009). The alternative to a disavowal of the psychological involves the slow 
work of enriching what we understand by this term by articulating differences – and by 
articulating the values involved in their (virtual and actual) enactments. As an anti-
polemical strategy, it is diametrically opposite to a superficially reassuring disavowal: its 
aim would be to assert that the psychological is relevant everywhere and to render it 
discussable in its multiple versions and implications.  
 
In asserting the importance of recognising different versions of the psychological I am 
making a point that is far from new. Writing in 1949, Viktor Von Weizsäcker (1989) 
lamented the direction that the development of psychosomatic medicine was taking in his 
day – which was its heyday. He claimed that the most conspicuous threat to the 
possibility of a non-dualistic medicine was not, as one might superficially expect, the 
type of medical thinking that is indifferent to the psychic domain. A much greater threat 
was posed, in his view, by the uncritical endorsement of the wrong kind of psychology. 
This problem, I contend, is still with us today. 
 
Conclusion 
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Few would deny that the MUS field is a conflictual space, where polemical styles of 
engagement inform the expectations of many healthcare professionals and sufferers alike. 
In this configuration, social scientists are not passive observers. Recent social research, I 
have argued, has amplified this dimension of conflict in both a positive and a negative 
sense: positively, it has lent its voice to the predicament of sufferers; but in so doing it 
has also often implicitly (re)produced a representation of medicine and medical 
(pro)positions as a polemical other, rather than a possible interlocutor.  One of my aims 
in this article has been to complicate this picture, by looking at how ‘MUS’ classification 
and nomenclature are far from uncontroversial among clinical researchers and clinicians 
themselves. Moreover, an overview of the debates suggests that clinicians consider 
questions of taxonomy and nomenclature as much from the perspective of a logic of care 
as from the perspective of scientific validity.  
 
Based on this overview, I also drew attention to what I called a disavowal of the 
psychological and suggested that, in so far as such a disavowal is apparent in the debates 
on nomenclature and classification, it reflects an explicit awareness of the performative 
dimension of naming and categorising. As a strategy to reduce clinical conflict, however, 
it is paradoxical in the long term, for it colludes with common prejudice in reinforcing the 
polemical connotations (and a reductive understanding) of the psychological. Similarly, 
the social-scientific framing of ‘MUS’ in terms of uncertain or contested illness, while 
supposedly neutral on the question of aetiology, does nothing to transform these 
reductive connotations. Against this tendency I proposed that the ‘psychological’ needs to 
be unpacked and made available for discussion in its multiple versions and in terms of the 
different values at stake within these. While it is unrealistic and perhaps unreasonable to 
expect clinicians to undertake this task, academic researchers and social scientists in 
particular are well placed to do so. 
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